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Abstract
This Note examines the problem of the unauthorized interceptionand transmission of United
States programming, specifically concentrating on programming intercepted in the Caribbean
Basin and Canada.
SIGNAL PIRACY: THE THEFT OF UNITED STATES
SATELLITE SIGNALS
INTRODUCTION
Advances in communications technology have enabled
United States cable television companies' and networks2 to
place their program signals3 on satellites4 and send them to
1. At present there are six United States domestic satellite systems carrying
cable and other television services. Motion Picture Exporting Association of
America, Inc., Memorandum on the Uses of Satellite Technology 23 (Jan. 30, 1984) (avail-
able from the Motion Picture Exporting Association of America) [hereinafter cited as
MPEAA Memo]. These are SATCOM III-R and SATCOM IV (owned by the Radio
Corporation of America (RCA)); WESTAR IV and WESTAR V (owned by Western
Union); COMSTAR D-4 (owned by American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) and General Telegraph & Electronics (GTE)); and GALAXY I (owned by
Hughes Communications). Id. Most of the major cable companies and networks are
carried by SATCOM III-R (ARTS, Cable News Network, Cinemax, Entertainment
and Sports Programming Network (ESPN), Music Television Network (MTV), Nickel-
odeon, Spotlight, Showtime, USA Network, The Weather Channel, WGN-TV Chi-
cago, and the Ted Turner Broadcasting Service (WTBS)); SATCOM IV (Bravo,
ESPN, the Financial News Network, and the Playboy Channel); and WESTAR V
(ARTS, Madison Square Garden Television, Satellite News Channels, and WOR-
TV). Id.
The marriage of cable and satellites began in 1975 when Home Box Office
(HBO), a distributor of premium television entertainment to cable television systems,
began to distribute its television programming via the satellite RCA SATCOM I.
Smith, The Birth of a Wired Nation, Channels of Communication, May 1981, at 53.
Satellite distribution gave HBO greater distribution capacity at a fraction of the costs
faced by the major networks, namely the American Broadcasting Company (ABC),
the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC). Schubin, Satellites: First They Went Beep, Home Video, April 1980, at 54. HBO
placed its signals on SATCOM I. Then cable television systems bought earth stations
to receive the signals. As other programmers put more signals on the satellite, and
more cable systems bought earth stations to receive the signals, a continuing cycle
began. Id. Since 1975, other domestic satellite systems have been launched, new
cable television companies have been established, and the industry seems well on its
way to wiring American society. Id.
2. Independent metropolitan television networks specializing in cable's two
most popular types of programming, sports and movies, are also filling channels by
satellite. Smith, supra note 1, at 35. By means of cable and satellites, these local
stations have become nationally broadcast "superstations." Id. Examples of such
independent networks are WTBS Atlanta, WOR-TV New York, and WGN-TV Chi-
cago. Id.
3. A program is a "body of live or recorded material consisting of images,
sounds, or both, embodied in signals emitted for the purpose of ultimate distribu-
tions." Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals
Transmitted by Satellite, opened for signature, May 21, 1974, art. I, 13 I.L.M. 1444,
1447 [hereinafter cited as Brussels Satellite Convention].
A signal is "an electronically-generated carrier capable of transmitting program-
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viewers' homes in areas that had once been too remote to re-
ceive such signals.5 However, satellite technology has not
progressed to the point where a satellite's "footprint" 6 may be
mes." Brussels Satellite Convention, supra, art. I. An emitted signal "is any pro-
gramme-carrying signal that goes to or passes through a satellite." Id. The signal is
transmitted to the satellite or "up-linked." MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 8. A de-
rived signal is "obtained by modifying the technical characteristics of the emitted
signal." Brussels Satellite Convention, supra, art. I. Transmissions from the satellite
are "down-linked." MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 8.
4. For a list of United States domestic satellites carrying cable and other televi-
sion services, see supra note 1.
A satellite is any device capable of transmitting signals that is situated in or
whose orbit is at least partially described in extraterrestrial space. Brussels Satellite
Convention, supra note 3, art. I; MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 8. Satellite transmis-
sion and distribution of cable signals involves a number of steps beginning with the
programs themselves. The programs originate by live or taped performance at the
network origination center. Technology, HBO Orientation Manual, 2-4 (1983) (HBO
training manual) (available on file at the offices of the Fordham International Law
Journal).
Programs are sent by cable or microwave from the pay-tv network studio to
the satellite "up-link"- that is, an earth station or "dish," capable of beam-
ing signals to one of the communications satellites in a fixed orbit 22,300
miles above the equator. Each satellite has a number of "transponders," or
channels, to carry the signals of the different program services. The signal is
amplified at the satellite and beamed back down to earth, and can be picked
up by a receiving earth station located at the cable system that is aligned to
pick up that particular signal. The signal is sent by cable or microwave from
the receiving station to the cable system's head-end, the location of the sys-
tem's signal processing and distribution equipment, where the signals on all
the channels the cable system offers are processed for balance and clarity.
From the head-end, the signals are transmitted on main trunk cables, and
then on to smaller cables leading to the customer's home.
Id.
The component parts of a satellite system are those in the "space segment" and
those in the "earth segment." MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 2. The former consists
of the power source (solar batteries), the positioning and orientation system, the con-
trol telemetry, the transponders and the antennas. Id. The latter consists of earth
stations. Each earth station includes an antenna system (or dish), a low noise ampli-
fier/converter (or "front end"), and a receiver (or "demodulator"). Id. at 4. The
earth station receives transmissions from the satellite. Id. at 5.
5. Cable television service began as a means of bringing a clear television pic-
ture and a greater selection of over-the-air television channels to areas of poor recep-
tion. Smith, supra note 1, at 32. When it was discovered that wiring could provide a
greater number of channels than could the airwaves, the uses for cable increased
dramatically. Id. However, because the cost of "laying hard wire" is substantial and
almost prohibitive in sparsely settled regions, urban areas as well as those portions of
the country not widely covered by cable are served instead by satellite. Id.
6. A "footprint" is the area of the earth's surface in which satellite transmissions
can be received. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 9. Size depends on the technical
aspects of the satellite, receiving dish, and environmental conditions. Id.
64 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 8:62
limited to the area it is intended to reach. On the contrary, a
significant amount of signal "spillover" occurs in large territo-
ries within the Western Hemisphere. 7  As a consequence,
countries in the Western Hemisphere are engaging in the un-
authorized interception and broadcasting of United States sat-
ellite signals.'
This Note examines the problem of the unauthorized in-
7. See Canadian Copyright Problems Focus of Hill Hearing, Broadcasting, Nov. 21,
1983, at 54; Dealing with the Footprint's Fallout, Broadcasting, July 4, 1983, at 66. At
present, signal spillover is confined to the Caribbean Basin countries and Canada
because only these areas are within the footprint of the signals. See id; see also Cana-
dian Copyright Problems Focus of Hill Hearing, supra. As satellites proliferate around the
globe, however, and as more and more United States signals are transmitted by these
satellites, it can be expected that unauthorized distribution of intercepted signals will
occur on a global basis. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Fairness Bill Hearing].
8. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 122. Producers and distributors of theat-
rical motion pictures in the United States and the world are in most cases the owners
of the copyrights in their works. They negotiate licenses for the products with pay
television programmers such as HBO and Showtime. The programmers then trans-
mit the product to United States cable systems by means of domestic satellites. Id.
Most programmers also license out the product to "superstations" whose signals are
transmitted by satellite to cable systems throughout the United States. In addition,
licenses are negotiated with United States television networks. The networks trans-
mit programs to their affiliate stations by means of domestic satellite systems. Id.
Some producers and distributors actually own or lease transponders (channels) on
domestic satellites in order to transmit to United States television and cable systems.
Id.
Licensing is the means by which a copyright owner expressly authorizes a distrib-
utor or originating organization to transmit the program to members of the viewing
public. See generally MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining licensing proce-
dures). An originating organization is the legal entity which decides that the trans-
mission of the derived signals to the general public or any section thereof should take
place. Id.
The Motion Picture Exporting Association of America (MPEAA) takes the posi-
tion that the originating organization is the entity which has received express authori-
zation from the program owner to distribute the program by satellite. Id. The dis-
tributor is the entity which has received express authorization from the program
owner or licensee to transmit the program to members of the viewing public. Id.
To illustrate: Suppose the satellite owner is RCA, the copyright owner is Para-
mount, the licensee is Showtime, and a common carrier which merely "up-links" a
"free" signal is Southern Satellite Systems. The originating organization would be
Showtime, and the cable system which has contracted with Showtime to carry its pro-
gramming would be the distributor. See id.
A number of licensing approaches exist in the area of cable retransmissions of
over-the-air broadcasts which may also apply to the reception and retransmission of
satellite signals. These are the following:
1) Statutory license whereby the cable operator or broadcaster is given a com-
pulsory license to retransmit subject to a standard fee fixed by statute, negotiation or
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terception and transmission of United States programming,
specifically concentrating on programming intercepted in the
Caribbean Basin and Canada. 9 Part I contains a brief introduc-
tion to and analysis of existing international copyright law, fo-
cusing on inadequacies in the law. A discussion of the Brussels
Satellite Convention, which attempts to address these inade-
quacies follows.' I In Part II, the problem of unauthorized sig-
nal interception and distribution in the Caribbean Basin and
Canada is examined against a backdrop of possible solutions.
These solutions involve both international copyright law and
United States implementation programs, such as the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative" (CBI) and the International Copyright
Fairness Bill' 2 (Copyright Fairness Bill). Finally, in Part III, a
by a statutory collection society. This approach tends to distort the real market value
of the work. Id. at 29.
2) The negotiated license under which the cable system or broadcaster bar-
gains freely for the right to retransmit. Id. Bargaining may be on an individual basis
or for a blanket license. Id.
3) The clearinghouse system whereby cable systems or broadcasters choose
whether or not to retransmit programming for which there is a predetermined fee. A
central clearinghouse quotes prices set by the originators or copyright holders, ap-
proves retransmission, and collects and distributes payments. Id.
Any transmission and distribution of a signal carrying unlicensed programming
is unauthorized and in violation of the owner's copyright in the work. See Copyright
Act § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Copyright Act].
United States satellite signals are captured by means of receiving antennas. See
Technology, supra note 4, at 2-4. The signals are either transmitted by conventional
broadcast or cable systems. For discussion of technical aspects of broadcasting, see
supra note 4. The signals may also be recorded on cassettes for later sale.
In order to prevent the reception of satellite signals by people who have not
subscribed to pay television service, many broadcasting and cable systems "scram-
ble" the signals. See id. Scrambling is the process of distorting the television picture
and/or signal so that it cannot be viewed or heard. Id. at 17. The signal is encoded,
and authorized viewers are provided with a descrambling device enabling them to
decide the scrambled signal. Id.
Scrambling, like licensing, is a means of protecting the copyright owner's exclu-
sive right to exploit his or her work. However, members of the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America (MPAA) believe that the cost of scrambling systems may be too
prohibitive for most broadcasters to use. Kerr, Foreign Piracy of TV Signals Stirs Con-
cern, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at Al, col. 6, C23, col. 5. In addition, the systems
may be inefficient in thwarting highly professional "pirates." Id.
9. See infra notes 112-205 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
11. Caribbean Basin Initiative, S. 544, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter
cited as CBI].
12. Copyright Fairness Bill, S. 736, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Fairness Bill].
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number of general options and recommendations are
proposed.
I. A CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
TREATIES
A. Background
Current treaties 13 involving international copyright law
generally contain anachronistic language relative to satellite
reception and retransmission, if they contain such provisions
at all.' 4 As a consequence, it is difficult to interpret and apply
existing treaty language to satellite signal disputes. In addi-
tion, a particular treaty may be inapplicable because the United
13. See infra notes 22-81 and accompanying text. All of the treaties discussed are
currently in force. Countries may be members of more than one treaty because the
treaty provisions overlap. Therefore, the newer treaties complement, rather than
conflict with their older counterparts.
The following treaties are discussed infra: The Brussels Satellite Convention,
supra note 3; The International Telecommunications Convention, latest revision Oct.
25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter cited as I.T.C.]; The Radio
Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893, latest revision July 17,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7435 [hereinafter cited as Radio Regulations];
The Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 8, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No.
3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]; The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, revised July 24, 1971, 331 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter cited as
Berne Convention]; The International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496
U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter cited as Rome Convention].
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, Aug. 20, 1971,
23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT] is not discussed
at length because it pertains to technical rather than copyright issues in telecommu-
nications. However, because INTELSAT represents a major international telecom-
munications governing body, the following brief background of the organization is
included.
INTELSAT owns and governs the "space segment." For definition of "space
segment," see MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 2. It regulates the establishing of facili-
ties, operations and services in the global satellite system. INTELSAT facilitates the
policy of building and operating a commercial communications satellite system with
the cooperation of the 109 member nations. S. Rep. No. 94, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1983). Member states must first coordinate their international satellite communica-
tions with INTELSAT to ensure technical compatibility with its system and to avoid
significant economic harm to the INTELSAT system. INTELSAT, supra, art. 14. The
system is composed mostly of government departments of post, telegraph and tele-
phone. Id. annex D.
14. See infra notes 23-99 and accompanying text.
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States or another disputing country has not ratified it.' 5 Fi-
nally, the relevant treaty may be difficult or impossible to en-
force because a member country may have inadequate or inef-
fective domestic implementing legislation.' 6
Countries adhering to a treaty which contains a national
treatment provision must afford the same copyright protec-
tions to foreign nationals that they afford to their own citi-
zens.' 7 Ideally, a country which grants its authors exclusive
rights to exploit their own works should likewise extend this
same treatment to foreign nationals whose works are exploited
abroad. In reality, such balance rarely occurs due to the inter-
pretation, application and enforcement problems which char-
acterize existing copyright law.' 8 Moreover, the national treat-
ment principle contained in many of the treaties often provides
lopsided protection.' 9 In the United States, production of
copyrighted works and exports generally tends to exceed those
of other nations.2 0 As a consequence, United States copyright
law has evolved to meet the needs of its copyright owners,
while the copyright law of other nations has not. In nations
which produce fewer commercially popular copyrighted ex-
ports, more elaborate copyright protection does not yet
exist.
2
'
15. The United States has not ratified the Berne Convention, supra note 13, the
Brussels Satellite Convention, supra note 13, or the Rome Convention, supra note 13.
16. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., U.C.C., supra note 13, art. II. This provision provides that: "Pub-
lished works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first published in that
State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as that other
State accords to works of its nationals first published in its own territory." Id. Berne
Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(1). The relevant article provides that:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under
this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin,
the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their
nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.
Id.
18. See generally Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 128 (discussion of problems
in existing treaties).
19. See id. at 16, 19; infra notes 23-111 and accompanying text.
20. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 17-18. "In the telecommunications
field-particularly program production-the United States is already the largest
copyright exporting state." Id.
21. See, e.g., id. at 19-22 (comparison of United States and Canadian copyright
law).
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B. International Copyright Treaties
1. The International Telecommunications Convention
One of the basic sources of international copyright protec-
tion is the International Telecommunications Convention
2
(I.T.C.) which addresses a wide range of telecommunications
issues. 23 First drafted in 1932, the I.T.C. has undergone a se-
ries of revisions, the most recent of which occurred in 1973.24
In the course of these revisions, attempts have been made to
address current telecommunications technology problems.2 5
Presently, however, the I.T.C. contains many gaps causing
problems of interpretation, application, and enforcement.26
The I.T.C. is administered in part by its accompanying Ra-
dio Regulations.27 Article 42(1) of the I.T.C. provides: "The
provisions of the Convention are completed by the Adminis-
trative Regulations which regulate the use of telecommunica-
tion and shall be binding on all Members."' 28 Therefore, mem-
bers of the I.T.C. are bound to follow article 17 of the Radio
Regulations, 29 which deals with the prevention of unauthor-
ized interception of radio signals.3 The language of article 17,
however, is ambiguous concerning satellite signal theft. For
example, article 17 provides that members of the I.T.C. are
22. I.T.C., supra note 13.
23. Id. art. 4. The stated purposes of the I.T.C. are:
a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement
and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;
b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most effi-
cient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunica-
tions services, increasing their usefulness and making them, so far as possi-
ble, generally available to the public;
c) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.
Id.
About 135 countries are signatories to the 1973 Convention, including the
United States. Id. annex 1.
24. The I.T.C. is the constitution of the International Telecommunications
Union (I.T.U.). The constitution is open for revision and readoption by the member
states in circa seven-year intervals. The most recent Convention was held in Malaga-
Torremolinos in 1973. I.T.C., supra note 13.
25. Id. art. 4; see supra note 23.
26. See infra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
27. See Radio Regulations, supra note 13. The Radio Regulations are intended
to "complete the provisions" of the I.T.C. I.T.C., supra note 13, art. 82.
28. I.T.C., supra note 13, art. 42(1).
29. Radio Regulations, supra note 13, art. 17.
30. Id.
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bound to prohibit and prevent "(a) the unauthorized intercep-
tion of radiocommunications not intended for the general use of the
public," and "(b) . . . publication or any use whatsoever, with-
out authorization, . . . obtained by the interception of the
radiocommunications mentioned [in paragraph (a) above]."'"
Problems arise in interpreting this language and in applying it
to satellite signal theft. The dispute focuses on the definition
of broadcasting. There is an inherent conflict in the Regula-
tions, which refer to broadcasting for the use of the public, in
article 17, and broadcasting for direct reception by the public in
article 1.
Article 132 defines the term "Broadcasting-Satellite Ser-
vice" as a "radiocommunication service in which signals trans-
mitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for di-
rect reception by the general public. . . . [T]he term 'direct
reception' [encompasses] both individual reception and corn-
munity reception."" Some member nations of the I.T.C. ar-
gue that under article 1, they are entitled to transmit or re-
transmit any signals made available to the public 4.3  They
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. art. I. This section is the definitional section of the Radio Regulations.
33. Id.
34. See generally MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 6, 36 (for analysis of the dispute).
The dispute focuses on the terms "broadcasting" and "intended for direct recep-
tion" by the general public. Members of the I.T.C. claim that the I.T.C. and its ac-
companying Radio Regulations protect only signals intended for direct reception by
the public. Id.
The contention is that "broadcasting" refers only to Direct Broadcasting Satel-
lites (DBS) id., which until recently were merely in the planning stage. Technology,
supra note 4, at 7. Conventional or "fixed satellite services" usually involve an inter-
mediate step whereby the satellite signal is received at a central point and redis-
tributed via cable and microwave. Id. In contrast, DBS distribute pay television pro-
gramming via satellite, directly to a subscriber's home. To receive DBS signals, a sub-
scriber must have his or her own receiving earth station or "dish." Id. Therefore,
because only DBS involve direct reception, it is maintained that the I.T.C. protection
does not extend to regular fixed satellite services. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 6,
36.
An analysis of the I.T.C. and its accompanying Radio Regulations points out the
fallacy in this argument. First, "broadcasting" is not an I.T.C. or Radio Regulations
term. Rather, the Convention and Regulations use a different term "broadcasting-
satellite service," as defined under article 1 of the Radio Regulations. See supra note 8
and accompanying text. The Radio Regulations authorize different frequency alloca-
tions for broadcasting satellite service and fixed satellite service. See Radio Regula-
tions, supra note 13, art. 5. This is the distinction between the two types of transmis-
sions. Broadcasting satellite services and fixed satellite services may overlap each
other's frequency allocations. Id. In addition, hybrid services composed of both
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maintain that these transmissions are intended for the general
public and are, therefore, outside the article 17 prohibitions. 5
To counter this argument, those who look to the I.T.C. for
copyright protection maintain that the term "broadcasting"
applies to satellite signals in general. 6 Therefore, copyright
holders are protected at both the transmission and reception
ends of the broadcast.3 7  While satellite signals may be in-
tended for reception by the public generally, they are not nec-
essarily intended for use by the general public.38 Rather, use
of the signals is confined to those authorized to receive the
signals. 9
In addition to its interpretation and application problems,
the I.T.C. contains ambiguous provisions regarding its en-
forcement. Although the I.T.C. may proscribe certain con-
duct, it does not provide sanctions and may therefore be unen-
forceable.40 Article 50 of the I.T.C.4' regarding dispute settle-
ment provides:
types of transmissions are possible. Id. Therefore, the term "broadcasting-satellite
services" does not refer exclusively to DBS.
Furthermore, "direct reception" under article I of the Radio Regulations in-
cludes both community and individual reception. See supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text. Direct reception, then, refers to satellite-to-cable system-to-home reception
in addition to the more direct satellite-to-home reception. MPEAA Memo, supra note
1, at 6. Community reception, therefore, includes the transmissions sent to cable
systems for further delivery to subscribers accomplished through distribution by the
cable system. Id. at 36.
35. See MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 36. For pertinent provisions in article 17,
see supra text accompanying note 31. For a discussion of transmissions intended for
the general public, see supra note 34.
36. See supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. See supra text accompanying note 30.
39. Id. See supra note 31.
40. Caribbean Basin Initiative Hearing on S. 544 Before the Comm. on Finance, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 395 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CBI-1983 Hearing]. Barbara Ringer,
former United States Register of Copyrights and then delegate of the United States
to the Brussels Conference in 1974 stated at the conference:
[O]ne of the alternatives discussed for solving the problem . . . was whether
the [I.T.C.] and the Radio Regulations . . . are capable of controlling the
problem. . . . [T]his alternative was rejected partly on the grounds that the
ITU Convention and the Regulations, to the extent that they actually cover
the problem as a technical matter, have no enforcement machinery, and it
was doubtful whether they could be made an effective means to combat sat-
ellite piracy.
Id.
41. I.T.C., supra note 13, art. 50.
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Members may settle their disputes or questions relating to
the interpretation or application of this Convention or of
the Regulations . . . through diplomatic channels, or ac-
cording to procedures established by bilateral or multilat-
eral treaties . . . or by any other method mutually agreed
upon . ... . If none of these methods of settlement is
adopted, any Member party to a dispute may submit the dis-
pute to arbitration in accordance with the procedure de-
fined in the General Regulations or in the Optional Addi-
tional Protocol.4 2
This article contains no specific implementing provisions. In-
stead, it leaves the general enforcement of the I.T.C. up to the
disputing parties, without really providing the parties with any
incentives to negotiate or to seek arbitration.
2. The Berne Convention
In contrast to the I.T.C., the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 43 (Berne Conven-
tion) grants specific protection to the owners of copyrights in
literary and artistic works in addition to providing protection
to "authors" of these works. 44 Due to new technological de-
velopments in telecommunications, copyright owners may be
unable to prevent the unauthorized use of their works,
notwithstanding the I.T.C.45 The Berne Convention, however,
grants additional copyright protection to authors of literary
and artistic works, giving them the exclusive right to authorize
the broadcasting or any other communication of their work to
the public. 46 In addition, the Berne Convention permits mem-
ber countries to implement compulsory copyright licenses in
connection with telecommunications.4 7 All sanctions for viola-
tions of the Berne Convention are pursuant to national imple-
mentation legislation. 48
42. Id.
43. Berne Convention, supra note 13.
44. Id. arts. 1, 2, 14bis.
45. See supra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
46. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. I Ibis. The principal import of the
Berne Convention is that it is the only international copyright treaty expressly grant-
ing protection directly to authors, rather than merely protecting against the unauthor-
ized use of their copyrighted works. Id. art. I; see AIPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 48.
47. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. I Ibis.
48. Id. art. 36.
1984]
72 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:62
The United States and a number of Latin American states
have not ratified the Berne Convention because adherence to
the Convention would require the contracting states to revise
their domestic copyright law.4 9 This fact makes the Berne
Convention unappealing to many nonmember nations. Unlike
the I.T.C., states adhering to the Berne Convention must pro-
vide national treatment, i.e. the same protection to foreign au-
thors as they provide to their own nationals.5" Regardless of
the national treatment a contracting state may provide, it is
also bound by a number of regulations governing its discretion
in affording copyright protection to foreign works. 5' Member
nations must subscribe to these regulations.52 Therefore, many
states have been prompted to forego adherence to the Berne
Convention.53
The Berne Convention seems to fill in some of the gaps
inherent in the I.T.C. by providing prohibitions against the un-
authorized use of an author's or copyright owner's work.54
However, the term "broadcasting" in the Berne Convention
poses interpretation and application problems similar to those
contained in the I.T.C.5 5 In addition, there is some dispute as
to whether the provisions of the Berne Convention apply to
satellite telecommunications at all.56 While the Berne Conven-
tion attempts to address the enforcement problems present in
49. Id. arts. 2, 2bis. The only Latin American nations which have ratified the
Berne Convention are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay.
WIPO, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic W11orks (Texts), § H2 at i
(1982).
The Berne Convention has been viewed as embodying concepts in conflict with
United States copyright law. These concepts include the "automatic recognition of
copyright without any formalities, the protection of'moral rights' and the retroactiv-
ity of copyright protection with respect to works which are already in the public do-
main in the United States." S. REP. No. 5, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Report on Copyright].
50. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 5; see supra note 17 (national treatment
provision in the Berne Convention).
51. See Berne Convention, supra note 13, arts. 2, 2bis, 7(4) (examples of types of
regulations).
52. See id. arts. 5, 6, 6bis, 18. But see id. arts. 7, 17 (allowing member states to
reserve certain rights and protections).
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. See Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 2.
55. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
56. Article I Ibis of the Convention specifically addresses broadcasting and com-
munications by "wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images" without referring to
satellite telecommunications. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 1 Ibis. Within
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the I.T.C., its stricter and more detailed provisions tend to dis-
courage membership.5" The I.T.C. may be too general in its
enforcement measures, but the Berne Convention may be just
as ineffectual in its inflexibility.
3. The Universal Copyright Convention
The Universal Copyright Convention" (U.C.C.) was
drafted in 1952 in reaction to the failure of the United States
and other Latin American states to ratify the Berne
Convention.59
Article IV, section (1) of the U.C.C. requires states to pro-
tect the copyright owner's right to authorize the reproduction
of their works by any means.6' However, interpretation and
application problems similar to those encountered in the
I.T.C. and Berne Convention characterize the U.C.C. as well.6"
Whether the term "broadcasting" under the U.C.C. applies to
satellites remains unclear.62
As a reaction to the strict compliance terms in the Berne
Convention, the drafters of the U.C.C. endeavored to include
as many states as possible in a simple, multinational copyright
agreement that would not require major amendments to the
domestic law of the contracting states.63 For this reason,
although the U.C.C., like the Berne Convention, provides for
national treatment, 64 its regulations generally lack the details
the communications industry, proponents of the Berne Convention argue that its
relevancy to satellites may be inferred. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 47.
57. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
58. U.C.C., supra note 13.
59. Seventy-four member countries are adherents to the Convention, including
the United States. Senate Report on Copyright, supra note 49, at 3.
60. U.C.C., supra note 13, art. IV (1). Article 4bis of the U.C.C. grants authors
of literary and artistic works protected by the Convention "the exclusive right to au-
thorize the reproduction by any means." Id. art. 4bis. Article 3 includes under the
protection of the Convention, "works published . . . whatever may be the means of
manufacturing the copies . . . [including] the communication by wire or the broad-
casting of literary or artistic works . Id. art. 3; cf. id. art. V (protection afforded
but no mention of broadcasting).
61. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 55 (for discussion of the problems posed by term broadcasting).
62. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 55.
63. See Fairness Bill, supra note 12, at 29.
64. Compare U.C.C., supra note 13, art. II with Berne Convention, supra note 13,
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that characterize the Berne Convention.6 5 As a result, the
U.C.C. suffers from the same enforcement and implementation
problems as the I.T.C.66
Enforcement under both the U.C.C. and the Berne Con-
vention is governed by the International Court ofJustice (I.CJ.
or Court), the body to which disputes between member states
are brought.6 7 The significance of I.C.J. jurisdiction is dimin-
ished considerably by the fact that the Court may not decide
any dispute between two parties unless the parties have specifi-
cally empowered the Court to do so.68 A party may consent to
third party settlement or may succumb to political pressure to
settle. However, the parties in dispute are usually "judges in
their own cause. '"69
4. The Rome Convention
The International Convention for the Protection of Per-
formers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organi-
zations 70 (Rome Convention), drafted in 1961, differs from the
treaties previously discussed in that it concerns "neighboring
rights,' i.e. the copyright protection granted to performers,
producers of phonograms (records) and broadcasters, rather
than the protection afforded the actual copyright owner of the
work.72
The Rome Convention grants broadcasting organizations
a limited, exclusive right to control the use of their broad-
art. 5. For a discussion of national treatment, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
65. Compare U.C.C., supra note 13 with Berne Convention, supra note 13.
66. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement and
implementation problems of the I.T.C.).
67. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 33.
68. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36(2).
69. R. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 194
(1974).
70. Rome Convention, supra note 13. The United States is not included among
the 40 member countries adhering to the Rome Convention. Records of the Diplo-
matic Conference on the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Pho-
nograms and Broadcasting Organizations, U.N. Doc. ILO/UNESCO/BIRPI at 19-20
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Protection of Performers].
71. Protection of Performers, supra note 70, at 35. Neighboring rights have
been defined as "the exclusive rights of a private character, in more or less creative
activities, granted in connection with the exploitation of copyrighted works." Fairness
Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 30.
72. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 30.
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casts. 73  However, the broadcasts themselves are not copy-
rightable works, and the broadcasters are not considered au-
thors, except if they create the work or purchase the rights
thereto.7 ' Furthermore, the application of the Rome Conven-
tion to cable television and satellite transmission is disputed
and unclear.75
Enforcement problems vary with the nature of the neigh-
boring rights conferred. 6 The Rome Convention is based
both on national treatment 77 and material reciprocity.7 8 The
latter allows a member state to provide for certain "reserva-
tions" to and limitations on its national treatment. 79 No uni-
formity of national treatment currently exists among member
states under the Rome Convention. 80 Rather, the protection
afforded by each contracting state varies according to its reser-
vations to a particular treaty and its national legislation.8'
C. The Brussels Satellite Convention
The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Pro-
gramme Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite82 (Brussels
Satellite Convention) presents the most promising alternative
for countries seeking protection for the copyrighted product of
73. Rome Convention, supra note 13, art. 13. Article 13 provides: "Broadcast-
ing organisations shall enjoy the right to authorise or prohibit: a) the rebroadcasting
of their broadcasts; b) the fixation of their broadcasts; c) the reproduction . . . of
their broadcasts ... ; d) the communication to the public of their television broad-
casts .. " Id.
74. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 50.
75. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 30. The Rome Convention does not
contain provisions explicitly defining the technical aspects of broadcasting and does
not mention satellite transmissions. See Rome Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
76. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
77. Rome Convention, supra note 13, art. 2. "For purposes of this Convention,
national treatment shall mean the treatment accorded by the domestic law of the
Contracting State in which protection is claimed .... ." Id.
78. See id. Material reciprocity allows a member country to provide "reserva-
tions" and limitations to its national treatment. Id. Article 2 § 2 provides: "National
treatment shall be subject to the protection specifically guaranteed, and the limita-
tions specifically provided for, in this Convention." Id.; see id. arts. 15-17 (examples
of reservations).
79. Id. arts. 5, 6, 15-18, 31, 34.
80. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 50.
81. Id.
82. Brussels Satellite Convention, supra note 13. Adopted in 1974, the Conven-
tion has been ratified by only eight nations, and the United States is not included
among these nations. Id.
76 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 8:62
their satellite transmissions.83 It was designed specifically to
address problems raised by transmissions via space satellites.84
At a series of preparatory meetings85 which led to the de-
velopment of the Brussels Satellite Convention, the delegates
considered a number of alternatives pertaining to the problem
of satellite piracy, including:
1) a revision of the I.T.C. or its accompanying Radio
Regulations;
2) a revision of the Rome Convention protecting "neigh-
boring rights";
3) the adoption of a new multilateral treaty; and
4) other options, such as reliance on existing international
agreements or the adoption of a simple resolution con-
demning satellite piracy.8 6
As the meetings progressed, the delegates clearly favored the
third option.8 7 Therefore, debate mainly focused on drafting
provisions for a new and independent multilateral treaty which
eventually became the Brussels Satellite Convention. 8
In drafting this new treaty, the central issue was whether
the Brussels Satellite Convention should grant to broadcasters
an exclusive right of authorization, or whether the notion of
establishing uniform private property rights should be aban-
83. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
84. International conference of States on the distribution of programme-carry-
ing signals transmitted by satellite, U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/CONFSAT.42 para.
5, at 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Conference]. The stated purpose of the
Brussels Conference was to consider "problems in the field of copyright and the pro-
tection of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations
raised by transmission via space satellites." Id.
85. The preparatory meetings were held in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1971,
Paris, France in 1972, and Nairobi, Kenya in 1973. Id. paras. 8, 11, 12, at 2-3. For an
in depth review of the working documents of the Lausanne conference, see Commit-
tee of Governmental Experts on Problems in the Field of Copyright and of the Pro-
tection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations
Raised by Transmissions Via Space Satellites, U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/SAT.22
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Lausanne Conference]. For a similar study of the Nairobi
conference, see Report on the Third Committee of Governmental Experts on
Problems in the Field of Copyright and of the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations Raised by Transmission Via Space
Satellites, U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/CONFSAT.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nai-
robi Conference].
86. Brussels Conference, supra note 84, para. 9, at 2.
87. Id.
88. See id.
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doned altogether.8 9 The latter option would leave the decision
to the contracting states to determine and implement the most
appropriate means for suppressing piracy in their territory. 90
The final draft adopted this approach. 9
The Brussels Satellite Convention creates an affirmative
obligation for its ratifying members to take "adequate meas-
ures to prevent the distribution on or from its territory of any
programme-carrying signal by any distributor for whom the
signal emitted to or passing through the satellite is not in-
tended."' 92 It contains no implementing provisions. Imple-
mentation is left to the discretion of each ratifying state,93 and
member nations are free to choose enforcement measures.94
The Brussels Satellite Convention attempts to fill gaps in the
body of international law relevant to satellite telecommunica-
tions.95 It contains definitions and technical terminology that
are recent enough to adequately address the issue of satellite
signal interception.96 Its vagueness in directing contracting
states to take "adequate measures" to achieve this desired aim
has both positive and negative ramifications. On the positive
side, it permits states to take decisive action against signal
piracy and grants states autonomy in determining which partic-
ular notion of copyright law to accept.97 On the negative side,
89. For reports of debates, see id. paras. 35-43, at 6-7; Nairobi Conference, supra
note 85, para. 54, at 559; Lausanne Conference, supra note 85, paras. 14-19, at 4-5.
90. Brussels Conference, supra note 84, para. 12, at 3.
91. See infra text accompanying note 92.
92. Brussels Satellite Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(1).
93. Brussels Conference, supra note 84, para. 79, at 15.
94. Id. These may include the creation of private rights in domestic copyright
law, sanctions in the penal code, or regulatory controls in telecommunications law.
Id.
95. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
96. For definitions and terminology, see supra notes 3-4. Interpretation prob-
lems may still arise. Article 3 excludes from protection, signals from the satellite
intended for the direct reception by the general public. Brussels Satellite Conven-
tion, supra note 3, art. 3. One may interpret this to mean that DBS transmissions are
not protected under the Brussels Satellite Convention. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1,
at 45. At the time of its drafting, no DBS satellites were in operation, but with their
advent, this may develop into a broad exception siphoning the potency from the
Convention. The MPEAA takes the position that the article 3 exclusion refers to
those transmissions which are intended to be received and used by anyone in the
public. Id. This interpretation excludes from the article 3 exception those transmis-
sions to be received by exclusive (or paying), particular members of the public. Id. at
45.
97. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 30-31.
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the Convention has a limited membership,98 and no clear and
successful mode of implementation currently exists.99
D. National Implementation and Remedies Under International
Copyright Law
Foreign states that are members of the international copy-
right treaties providing for national treatment' 0 0 and those
countries adhering to the Brussels Satellite Convention provi-
sions requiring "adequate measures"' 0 ' must implement these
provisions through their domestic law in order for the treaties
to be effective. National implementation poses problems be-
cause many states have ineffectual or nonexistent implement-
ing legislation if they are adherents to international treaties at
all. 102
United States domestic provisions implementing the inter-
national copyright treaties may be found in the Communica-
tions Act of 1934103 and the Copyright Act of 1976.104 How-
98. Id. States have been unwilling to ratify the Convention for a number of rea-
sons. In the United States, domestic private sector support has been minimal
because:
First, national program producers and distributors believed that the obliga-
tions of the member states . . . were weak and could be circumvented...
through the optional limitations on protection provided for in Article 4 and
Article 8(3) concerning uses by developing countries of educational or in-
formational parts of programs . . . and possible reservations with respect to
cable distribution respectively; [They] hoped that time would allow for the
creation of a new Convention with stronger provisions. Second, during the
early years following the establishment of the Convention, there was little
use of satellites for the delivery of programming and, . . . limited availabil-
ity of satellite reception earth stations. Finally, educational groups within
the United States believed that the optional limitations on protection were
not broad enough.
Id. at 31-32.
99. In the Brussels Satellite Convention itself, no implementing provisions exist.
However, in the United States, § 605 of the Communications Act, Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982), when read in conjunction with United States
copyright law provisions, Copyright Act, supra note 8, has been viewed as "adequate
implementing legislation." Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 32-33. For discus-
sion of the Communications Act and the Copyright Act, see infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 77-78 (a discussion of national treatment).
101. See supra text accompanying note 93.
102. See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
103. Communications Act of 1934, supra note 99, §§ 605, 501-502. Section 605
prohibits the unauthorized publishing or interception of any communications by wire
or radio to the public. Id. § 605. Sections 501 and 502 provide penalties for viola-
tions of any act under the statute. Id. §§ 501-502.
104. Copyright Act, supra note 8, §§ 111, 501-506, 509. Under § 111(b) the un-
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ever, there is some question as to whether these implementing
provisions are adequate without certain revisions and amend-
ments." 5 In Canada, domestic implementation is accom-
plished through the Copyright Statute and the Canadian Ra-
dio-television and Telecommunications Commission10 6
(CRTC). The Canadian Copyright Statute t°7 does not afford
copyright protection to cable retransmissions or satellite trans-
missions.' 0 8  The CRTC regulations contain no provisions
authorized secondary transmission to the public of a primary transmission of a work
is actionable as an infringement and subject to the remedies provided by §§ 502-506,
509. Id. § lIl(b).
105. Although § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, supra note 99, and the
relevant provisions in the Copyright Act, supra note 8, may be regarded as adequate
implementing legislation, see MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 44, two bills were pro-
posed by the 97th Congress to incorporate certain revisions in both of the acts. See
H.R. REP. No. 559, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Report on
Proposed Copyright Amendments]; H.R. REP. No. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Bill to Amend the Communications Act]. Proponents of the
bills believe that changes in technology have made compulsory licensing systems un-
necessary and inappropriate on both national and international levels. See Report on
Proposed Copyright Amendments, supra, at 45. The proposed amendments would revise
the compulsory licensing section of the Copyright Act and § 605 of the Communica-
tions Act. The amendments would allow copyright owners freedom to negotiate li-
censing arrangements in a competitive marketplace in lieu of the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal's predetermined licensing fee system.
The MPEAA also believes that § 605 of the Communications Act may represent
"substantial compliance" with the "adequate measures" requirements of the Brus-
sels Satellite Convention, but that the section could be further "strengthened."
MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 44.
In addition, the MPEAA adopts the position that the relevant sections of the
Copyright Act satisfy the obligations imposed by the Brussels Satellite Convention.
Id. Section 501 (b) of the Copyright Act gives copyright owners standing to sue, and
§§ 501-506 and 509 provide remedies for infringement. Copyright Act, supra note 8,
§§ 501-506, 509. However, the MPAA believes that satellite transmissions challenge
the basic concepts of the compulsory licensing section of the Act because satellite
technology has expanded the once exclusively local market upon which the system
was initially based. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 47-48, Serial No. 28 (1979) (MPAA position on cable retransmissions)
[hereinafter cited as Compulsory Licensing Hearing]. Therefore, the MPAA advocates
certain amendments to the Copyright Act which would affect the compulsory licens-
ing system. See id. For discussion of proposed amendments, see infra notes 206-220
and accompanying text.
106. Copyright Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-30, § 1; MPEAA Memo, supra note 1,
at 56.
107. Copyright Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-30, § 1.
108. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 56.
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prohibiting the unauthorized interception of satellite signals
and cable television programming.'0 9 The copyright laws of
many Caribbean Basin nations offer even less protection than
Canadian law." 0 Furthermore, because they have not enacted
copyright statutes, many Caribbean Basin nations provide no
copyright protection. I
II. SIGNAL THEFT IN FOCUS: CANADA AND THE
CARIBBEAN BASIN
The following discussion focuses on the specific problem
of United States signal theft by Canada and nations in the Car-
ibbean Basin." 2 The spillover of pay programs, primarily en-
tertainment, news, and sports programming has been the gain
of entrepreneurs in Canada" 3 and the Caribbean." 4  It be-
comes difficult to reach solutions among governments because
109. Id.
110. See id. at 56-61 (comparison of copyright laws of Canada and Caribbean
Basin nations).
111. For example, Costa Rican copyright law does not address the issue of pro-
tection granted to cable or satellite transmissions. Id. at 59. Antiquated copyright
statutes in many of the Caribbean countries have not kept up with radical technologi-
cal advances in the delivery of programming. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at
126. Belize has no copyright laws, nor do the Cayman Islands. MPEAA Memo, supra
note 1, at 60.
112. See supra note 7; infra notes 114-204 and accompanying text.
113. Canadian cable systems, including Cancom, a new expanded service of Ca-
nadian Satellite Communications, Inc., are intercepting United States broadcast sig-
nals and distributing them to Canadian viewers. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at
144-45. No compensation is paid to United States copyright holders whose works
are embodied in those signals. United States cable operators on the other hand must
pay Canadian copyright owners for similar use of their copyrighted works. Id.
114. The government-owned Jamaican broadcast company has screened "Pol-
tergeist," "Missing," "Victor/Victoria," "Rocky III," and other films that have not
yet reached Jamaican movie theatres. Kerr, supra note 8, at AI, col. 6. The television
broadcasts, which were distributed without authorization from United States cable
networks caused a 50% drop in revenues for Jamaican theatres. Id. at C26, col. 3.
In the Central American nation of Belize, seven privately run television stations
rely for their programming on unauthorized transmissions taken from United States
satellites. Id. Broadcasts include programs from HBO, Cinemax, Spotlight, CNN,
Satellite News Channel and the "superstations," WGN-TV Chicago and WOR-TV in
Secaucus, New Jersey. id. Likewise, a cable television service in Haiti transmits news
and other American cable television programs to 7,000 customers. Id. at C26, col. 4.
In SanJos6, Costa Rica, a cable company with more than 4,000 subscribers offers
United States movies and sports programs. In addition, Costa Rican television view-
ers receive American cable programs on five VHF and one UHF channel. Id. at C26,
col. 6. In Antigua, Haiti and Saint Kitts, government controlled over the air broad-
casts have been distributing unscrambled television programs free of charge. The
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many governments not only license signal theft, but in some
cases become involved in it themselves." 5
State Department officials, as well as the motion picture
and television industries in the United States concerned about
signal theft, have labelled the practice "piracy."' 16 The situa-
tion is seen as a serous threat to overseas markets for United
States films which now earn more than $1.25 billion a year, or
30% of the revenue of United States movie makers." 7 The
"piracy" of United States programming could critically affect
film companies which depend for their profits on foreign sales
of their motion pictures." 8 Furthermore, the market for works
by United States copyright owners has diminished because
cable television companies and television networks may now
bypass the originators or owners of the programming." 19
States involved in signal theft have countered the accusa-
tions of "piracy" and copyright infringement by arguing that
their own copyright and satellite communications laws are
often ambiguous or nonexistent and that the United States
may not impose its own laws on the rest of the world. 120 They
argue that United States signals are part of a "common heri-
tage that should be provided to developing countries without
charge."' 2' Therefore, some states feel entitled to take advan-
programming is derived from several sources including HBO. Fairness Bill Hearing,
supra note 7, at 23.
Programming similar to the above has been broadcast by private subscription
television stations located in Belize and Honduras. These stations differ from over
the air broadcast stations in that the intercepted programming is in scramble form.
Potential viewers must pay a subscription fee to the stations to descramble the sig-
nals. Id.
A number of privately owned cable television companies operate in the Domini-
can Republic, Guatemala and Panama. These systems have a wider channel capacity
than either over the air broadcasting or subscription television. They can, therefore,
distribute programming from a wider variety of sources. These include CNN, ESPN,
HBO, MTV, SIN, USA Network and the resale version feeds of WGN and WTBS. Id.
In the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, hotels catering to English speaking
tourists have constructed "television receive only" earth stations which intercept var-
ious United States satellite program services. Id.
115. See supra note 114 (specifically discussing the governments ofJamaica, Anti-
gua, Haiti and Saint Kitts).
116. Kerr, supra note 8, at AI, col. 6.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at C26, cols. 3-4.
121. CBI-1983 Hearing, supra note 41, at 397.
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tage of the signal "spillover" which offers them a chance to
share in the information and entertainment programming that
was until recently only available to wealthier states or states
that produce a great amount of copyrighted works.' 22
On a national scale, the United States government has
taken steps to fill gaps in the protection afforded by the inter-
national copyright law.'12 The Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) takes the position that "United States pro-
grams emanate from a greater sensitivity on the part of our
government as to the value of our copyright industries and a
willingness to demand respect for that property as part of our
foreign and trade policies." '24 This reference to United States
programs involves both unilateral action on the part of the
United States as well as bilateral agreements between disput-
ing countries. 25 The former is exemplified by the Interna-
tional Copyright Fairness Bill,' 26 a proposed program which
addresses signal theft in Canada, as well as other nations. 27
The latter is illustrated by provisions in the Caribbean Basin
Initiative' 8 which has been enacted and implemented by the
United States. 29 While both programs seek to address the
same problem, their approaches in creating incentives to dis-
courage signal theft differ. The Copyright Fairness Bill pro-
poses to amend United States copyright law.' 3 ° The Carib-
bean Basin Initiative is a foreign aid program tying trade sanc-
122. Kerr, supra note 8, at C26, col. 4.
123. See infra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
124. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 129-30.
125. See, e.g., id.
126. Fairness Bill, supra note 12.
127. Id. But see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
128. CBI, supra note 11. The purpose of the CBI is: "To provide that nonresi-
dent, foreign nationals not be compensated unless such claimant's country compen-
sates United States citizens for retransmissions of materials they own." Id.
129. See CBI Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1982) (relevant implementation provisions cited) [hereinafter cited as CBI-1982 Sen-
ate Bill]; H.R. REP. No. 7397, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as CBl-
1982 House Bill]. The 1982 bill was approved by the House and Senate in the 97th
Congress. The CBI is substantially similar to the 1982 version. For detailed discus-
sion of goals and purposes behind the 1982 bill, see Caribbean Basin Initiative, Presi-
dent Reagan's address before the Organization of American States on February 24,
1982, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 217 (March 1, 1982). For detailed discussion of
the 1983 proposal, see CBI-1983 Hearing, supra note 41.
130. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
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tions to copyright protection. 13 '
In addition to the Copyright Fairness Bill and the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative, other programs tying trade sanctions to
copyright have been proposed in the House and Senate. 32
The United States government hopes that foreign nations will
not only discourage piracy, but will also be encouraged to en-
act national copyright laws and participate in international
conventions. 
33
A. Canada and the International Copyright Fairness Bill
Canadian cable systems are able to pick up United States
broadcast signals and transmit them to Canadian viewers. 4
No compensation is being paid by the Canadian systems to
United States copyright holders, although United States cable
operators must remunerate Canadians for similar exploitation
of their works. 13 5 This lack of reciprocity in regard to copy-
right protection has engendered a number of concerns in the
United States.' 36 Although both the United States and Canada
131. See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text (dealing with the Caribbean
Basin Countries specifically).
134. Canada represents a large market for United States motion picture and tel-
evision programming. For many years, cable systems in Canada have supplemented
conventional antenna reception by delivering to their subscribers copyrighted pro-
gramming broadcast by United States television stations located near the border.
Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 20. Now, the expanded services of Cancom af-
ford the opportunity to broaden the cable coverage of United States border stations.
Cancom is now intercepting broadcast signals of selected border affiliates of the
ABC, CBS, NBC and PBS network and distributing them via satellite to Canadian
cable systems and other reception/distribution entities. Id.
135. Section 111 of the Copyright Act extends protection to broadcast signals
through the compulsory licensing system. See Copyright Act, supra note 8, § 111.
Under the system, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, see infra note 139, collects royal-
ties that United States cable operators pay to. television stations for the use of their
material. Id. The Tribunal collects royalties for both foreign as well as United States
copyright owners whenever their programs are retransmitted by United States cable
systems. Therefore, United States copyright law compensates Canadian copyright
owners for the use of their works in the United States. Copyright Act, supra note 8,
§ 111(c).
Under the present Canadian copyright law, however, the interception and re-
transmission of broadcast signals by cable systems does not constitute an infringe-
ment of the copyrighted works carried by the signals. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note
7, at 21. Thus, Canadian distribution of this programming, whether it is Canadian or
foreign, is done legally without authorization or compensation. Id.
136. First, the unfairness of the compensation systems is apparent in the fact
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are signatories of the U.C.C., and both nations are in conform-
ity with the treaty, an imbalance in copyright protection exists
under the national treatment provision afforded by the
treaty. 13
7
In response to these problems, Senator Patrick Leahy has
proposed a solution, an amendment to section I1I of the
Copyright Act. The amendment is in the form of a bill, S.736
entitled The International Copyright Fairness Bill.13 8  Under
the amendment, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal 39 must first
find that a royalty claimant's country provides equivalent com-
pensation to American copyright holders for the use of their
material abroad before royalties are disbursed to nonresident
foreign nationals for cable retransmissions. 4 ° Otherwise, the
Tribunal will retain the foreign royalty claimant's fees. 14 1
Although the bill would apply to any foreign nation, it is di-
rected mainly at Canada. 42 In effect, the bill is designed to
that Canadian copyright owners received almost one-quarter million dollars for
United States cable retransmissions of their programming in 1981. Fairness Bill Hear-
ing, supra note 7, at 127. If Copyright Royalty Tribunal statutory rates rise, so will
these figures. Id. Second, Canada's protectionist stance may continue, and United
States copyright holders are upset because Canadian cable systems are making
money off their products without having to pay for them. Canadian Copyright Problems
Focus of Hill Hearing, Broadcasting, Nov. 21, 1983, at 54. At the expense of foreign
authors' rights, limits on exclusive rights may be written into Canadian copyright law
to reduce or entirely avoid remuneration to United States copyright owners. Cana-
dian policy makers have not, up until recently, considered recognition of copyright
liability for cable retransmission. Solution Evolving to Canadian Copyright Problem,
Broadcasting, May 21, 1984, at 42. Third, if this protection is not granted, the
United States will be deprived of compensation for or control over a significant com-
mercial exploitation of their works. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 22. Fourth,
other nations, especially net importers of copyrighted works, will be aware of the
situation between the United States and Canada and will be reluctant to afford
greater benefits to the United States and Canadian copyright owners than the United
States and Canada do themselves. Id. Although meetings between United States and
Canadian officials are being conducted on the issue, Solution Evolving to Canadian Copy-
right Problem, supra, at 42, there is slim prospect that Canada will revise its copyright
law in the near future. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 127.
137, See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
138. Fairness Bill, supra note 12.
139, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is a "[flederal body appointed by the Pres-
ident by and with the advice and consent of the Senate statutorily charged with,
among other duties, the adjustment of cable copyright compulsory license fees and
the distribution of such collected fees to copyright claimants." S. REP. No. 94, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1983).
140. Copyright Fairness Bill, supra note 12, § I11(c)(5).
141. Id.
142. Cohodas, New Technology Puts Strain on Old Laws, CONG. Q. 135, 140 (1984).
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restore the balance between United States and Canadian trade
practices in copyrighted works, by creating a reciprocal rela-
tionship with respect to compensation for their use. 14 3
Advocates of the bill hope that it will provide an incentive
for Canada to revise its copyright laws. The presumption un-
derlying this hope is that the United States telecommunica-
tions market is sufficiently attractive, so that the bill would en-
courage Canada to adopt a reasonable system for protecting
United States copyright owners in their cable market. 4 4 How-
ever, the bill has been vehemently criticized, and it is doubtful
that it will be passed. 145
Critics of the bill argue that it violates the U.C.C. principle
of national treatment" because it discriminates against foreign
copyright owners. 146 In contrast, Canada's activities remain
within the U.C.C. provision because Canadian copyright law
affords no greater protection for its nationals than it does for
foreign copyright owners. 14  It has also been argued that the
enactment of the bill would harm United States copyright own-
ers.' 48 By enacting the bill the United States will create greater
incentives for foreign states to evade the international treaty
principle of national treatment. 49
Popular United States movies and television programs
comprise a good portion of United States copyrighted exports.
Stronger domestic copyright laws encourage the export of
copyrighted works. Smaller countries with fewer copyright ex-
ports fear that United States copyright owners will benefit
from increases in copyright protection to the detriment of their
local interests. 5 ° They believe that the United States is
already too significant a beneficiary of national treatment
throughout the world.' 5 ' The Copyright Fairness Bill would
143. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 16.
144. Id.
145. Cohodas, supra note 142, at 140. It has been asserted that Senator Leahy,
the proponent of the Bill, may be more interested in getting the Canadians' attention
than in getting the legislation passed. Id.
146. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 5.
147. Copyright Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-30, § 1 (1970); see also Fairness Bill
Hearing, supra note 7, at 37.
148. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 39.
149. Id.; see infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
150. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 39.
151. Id.
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therefore discourage, rather than encourage foreign nations to
adopt the Berne Convention, the U.C.C., and other interna-
tional treaties. 5'5 2 As a corollary to this, there is a danger that
foreign states will resist modernization of their copyright laws
to prevent the growth of markets for United States works in
their territory. 53 They may also adopt discriminatory pro-
grams disfavoring United States works. 1 54 A revision of Cana-
dian law granting copyright protection to programs retrans-
mitted by cable, or a bilateral agreement for reciprocal com-
pensation may provide more viable solutions to the signal theft
dispute between the United States and Canada.
55
B. The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Tying Copyright to Trade
Sanctions and Foreign Aid
Governments, private companies and individual entrepre-
neurs in the Caribbean Basin area are all involved in the inter-
ception of United States domestic satellite signals.' 56 These
entities are retransmitting the programs from United States
signals either to the general public or to a specific group such
as cable television paying subscribers or hotel guests. 57 No
compensation has been offered to the United States copyright
owners for the use of these programs in the commercial
marketplace. 58
The MPAA regards the interception of the satellite signals
as "grand theft.''' 59 The foreign television stations and cable
company owners see the practice quite differently and claim
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Historical realities illustrate that discriminatory policies based on a for-
eign nation's desire to promote indigenous authorship, to thwart the flood of foreign
works, and to defend a distinctive national culture are rarely effective to meet these
ends. However, national politics keep them alive. Id. at 37.
155. Id. at 81.
156. Id. at 124-26; Dealing with the Footprint's Fallout, Broadcasting, July 4, 1983,
at 66.
157. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 123.
158. Id. These unauthorized transmissions disrupt the established theatrical
and television markets in which United States copyright owners have traditionally
marketed their product, thereby imposing a two-fold loss on these copyright owners:
1) They are not compensated for the commercial use of their programs;
2) Markets from which they have traditionally garnered revenues have been di-
minished. Id. at 24.
159. Kerr, supra note 8, at C26, col. 3.
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that their actions are legal.' 60  They claim that the United
States attitude reflects cultural imperialism and hypocrisy.' 6'
On the one hand, the United States asserts the right to project
its programs into foreign territories. On the other hand, the
United States communications industry complains that foreign
countries intercept and use United States programs for com-
mercial purposes. 16 2 Yet, the United States has not responded
to complaints about the satellite signal spillover. 63
Most of the Caribbean nations are members of the
I.T.C. 164 The I.T.C. contains provisions prohibiting member
states from the unauthorized taking of satellite signals.' 65 The
Caribbean nations, by their actions, are violating this provi-
sion, whether or not the United States disclaims responsibility
for the spillover. As the discussion in Part I illustrated, how-
ever, difficulties in interpretation, application and enforcement
of the treaty provisions render it ineffective.' 66
Efforts by a number of MPAA companies to bring legal
action protecting their copyrights in Caribbean Basin countries
engaging in the practice of signal theft16 have proved frustrat-
ing. 168 Scrambling 169 poses another possible solution, but it is
160. Id.; see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussion of Carib-
bean Basin countries' objections).
161. See Maeckle, Costa Rica Jlatches Lots of Television-but is it stealing those cable
signals?, The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 26, 1983, at 31.
162. See generally Kerr, supra note 8.
163. In response to the argument that satellite signal spillver threatens the in-
tegrity of national cultures, one commentator has written: "Should we take seriously
the allegation that [satellite television] broadcasting represents an active threat to the
integrity of national cultures? It is hard to do so when we are aware that there is no
imminent prospect of [broadcasts] to countries that do not wish to receive them." DE
SOLA POOL, Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of Vational Cultures, in NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 120 (K. Nordenstreng & H. Schil-
ler eds. 1979).
The governments of Canada and the receiving countries in the Caribbean Basin
seem to be cooperating if not participating in the signal theft. See supra note 115.
164. I.T.C., supra note 13, annex 1.
165. See, e.g., Radio Regulations, supra note 13, art. 23; supra notes 22-42 and
accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
167. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 126.
168. Id. A variety of legal obstacles frustrate the MPAA's efforts to protect their
copyrights. Antiquated statutes in many of the countries do not reflect the new tech-
nology. Id. In addition, case law is developing very slowly in these countries. For
example, an MPAA lawsuit against a hotel in the Bahamas has been postponed for
over a year because the local court is unable to decide the characteristics of a pro-
tected public performance. Id. Finally, plaintiffs in many Caribbean countries are up
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not certain whether scrambling systems will become inexpen-
sive enough for most broadcasters to use and effective enough
to thwart highly professional pirates. 170 Licensing 171 is an-
other proposed solution, but Caribbean Basin countries lack
incentives to negotiate licensing terms.7 2 The United States
and the Jamaican Broadcasting Service have begun good faith
negotiations to reach a licensing agreement. 73 Other govern-
ments have not initiated any action which addresses the
problem. 174
It appears that most available solutions are either inade-
quate, impractical, or ineffectual. However, the United States
has entered into a foreign aid program with the Caribbean Ba-
sin countries which may prove to be a viable alternative. 175
This program, entitled the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 176 ap-
pears to be working injamaica. 17 Under the program, certain
Caribbean countries are eligible for preferential access to
United States markets if they adequately and effectively protect
United States intellectual property.
178
The Caribbean Basin Initiative "seeks to promote the
strength and resiliency of twenty-seven countries in the Carib-
bean Basin by affording eligible states economic and United
States' tariff benefits."'' 7 9 Eligibility depends upon an evalua-
tion against certain statutory criteria, some mandatory and
some discretionary. 80 The Caribbean Basin Initiative includes
the offer of valuable trade concessions by the United States as
an incentive to prevent piracy."' The CBI encourages nations
against procedural difficulties to the point where litigation becomes an inefficient,
costly and ineffectual way to enforce ownership of copyrights. Id.
169. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
170. Kerr, supra note 8, at C26, col. 5.
171. See supra notes 8 and accompanying text.
172. Dealing with the Footprint's Fallout, supra note 156, at 66.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. CBI, supra note 11.
176. Id.
177. Kerr, supra note 8, at C26, cols. 3-4. Jamaica, probably the largest recipient
of CBI benefits, has agreed to discontinue United States satellite interception, while
negotiating for appropriate licenses limited to material available for broadcast televi-
sion. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 126.
178. CBI-1983 Hearing, supra note 41, at 390.
179. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 44.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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to enact both domestic laws protecting intellectual property'8 2
as well as laws favorable to United States copyright exports. 8 3
This last criterion calls for modernization of international
copyright law.' 8 4 It is apparent why the Caribbean Basin Initi-
ative has been termed the "carrot and stick approach."1 85
The Caribbean Basin Initiative is effective where the
Copyright Fairness Bill fails for a number of reasons. 86 Many
states lack incentive to enter into copyright treaties or licens-
ing agreements 8 7 because using copyright law as the sole basis
for negotiations is tactically ineffective. It is not in the interests
of less wealthy nations to strengthen their copyright laws
where their exports of copyrighted works are greatly exceeded
by those of the United States. The United States must there-
fore balance its desire for copyright protection against the de-
veloping countries' desires for benefits of comparable
worth.'8 8 It becomes necessary to link the copyright issue to
an overall trade "fit" with a particular state, thereby obtaining
greater negotiating leverage than would be the case with tradi-
tional bilateral or multilateral treaties.'8 9 In effect, the United
States' concern with protecting its copyright exports will be
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 45.
185. Id. "The 'carrot and stick' approach taken by [the] CBI in the case of copy-
right infringements of satellite distributed works may be justified by the relative new-
ness of the problem ...and the gravity of the dangers of the practices if not
checked." Id.
186. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
188. Caribbean countries engaging in piracy import much United States copy-
righted material while the United States imports very little of theirs. See Fairness Bill
Hearing, supra note 7, at 42. Therefore while the CBI is effective in the Caribbean, it
would not necessarily be an appropriate solution to the problem in Canada, a com-
paratively wealthy nation, containing a healthy market in copyrighted exports. The
CBI is acceptable where the Copyright Fairness Bill fails because it furthers United
States domestic copyright interests without compromising the basic structure of in-
ternational copyright law and the principle of national treatment. See supra notes 77-
78 and accompanying text. If the Bill were adopted, it might be effective in dealing
with piracy, but it is not necessarily fair in keeping with the national treatment philos-
ophy of international copyright law. It would not, encourage the development of
copyright relations in all countries, which is the overall aim of international copyright
law. Id. The CBI presents an alternative means to protect and promote the United
States copyright export industries while the United States waits for international
copyright law to catch up with technology. It is a positive approach and gives incen-
tives to Caribbean Basin countries to change their laws. Id.
189. Id.
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readily apparent in its overall trade relationship with other
countries. 190
Two additional United States programs similarly tying
copyright protection to trade sanctions and foreign aid have
been proposed by Congress. Like the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive, these programs involve action on the part of the executive
and legislative branches which would offer immediate remedial
measures until international copyright law catches up with
technology. 19
The first program is a bill to renew the Generalized System of
Preferences'92 (GSP). Under this system, developing states are
permitted to introduce their products into United States mar-
kets duty free on the condition that certain copyright protec-
tions are afforded to United States intellectual properties. 193
In determining whether a country receives beneficiary status,
the President "must take into account the extent to which a
country is providing under its law adequate and effective
means for foreign nationals not only to secure, but also effec-
tively to exercise and to enforce, exclusive rights in intellectual
property." 194
The second program, the International Security and Develop-
ment Cooperation Act of 19831' (ISDCA) links copyright protec-
tion to foreign aid.' 96 The President is directed, in determin-
ing the assistance level of a country, to consider the extent to
which the foreign government permits a government-owned
entity or national of that country to engage in the broadcast of
copyrighted material belonging to United States copyright
owners without their express consent. 1.97
190. Id.
191. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
192. S. REP. No. 485, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GSP].
193. See id. at 9.
194. Id.
195. H.R. REP. No. 2992, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
1SDCA Bill] is the bill authorizing appropriations for the fiscal year in the forms con-
templated by the ISDCA.
196. Id. The ISDCA Bill is designed to provide economic development assist-
ance, food for the hungry, special humanitarian assistance, and trade opportunities.
H.R. REP. No. 192, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Report on
ISDCA Bill].
197. Report on ISDCA Bill, supra note 196, § 904. ISDCA Bill, supra note 195.
Section 904 pertains to international copyright protection. Its terms are phrased in
much the same language as the GSP. See Report on ISDCA Bill, supra note 196, § 904.
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In addition, the ISDCA addresses the matter of the Federal
Communications Commission's'9 (FCC) Transborder deci-
sions. 99 Under these decisions a number of satellite resale
carriers2 °° have applied and received authorization by the FCC
to extend their services to foreign regions2"' located within
their footprint.2 The FCC authorization is subject to two
conditions: 1) the consent must be obtained from the state of
delivery; and 2) a waiver from Intelsat is required. 20 3 Further-
more, the ISDCA conditions the FCC authorization of trans-
border delivery of domestic satellite signals on the State De-
partment's efforts to obtain assurances from the foreign coun-
tries concerned that they will negotiate the appropriate
licensing fees and authorizations with American copyright
holders.20 4 These assurances are important, for without them,
it is doubtful that American copyright owners would receive
198. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), created by Congress in
1934, is the administrative agency which regulates broadcasting in the United States.
Communications Act of 1934, supra note 99, § 151. The FCC's basic regulatory
guidelines can be found in the Communications Act of 1934. Id. The FCC also
creates much law itself in administering the Act. The FCC has developed a body of
regulations which bind broadcasters as a result of its interpretations and rulings on
the Act. D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAw 13 (1981).
199. See In Re Satellite Business Systems, 91 F.C.C.2d 940 (1982); Transborder
Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981).
200. A satellite resale carrier is a private satellite system used to deliver signals
to cable television systems. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 25. For example,
International Satellite, Inc., which is 15% owned by the parent company of WTBS,
has applied for authorization to construct and operate a private satellite system to
deliver signals across national borders. Id. This is the so-called "transborder
delivery."
201. The regions included are: Costa Rica, Mexico, Haiti, Jamaica, the Baha-
mas, Bermuda and Canada. Id.
202. See supra note 199.
203. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 25. For example, RCA seeks approval
to transmit an entertainment and sports programming network on Satcom III-R to
the Caribbean. First it applies to the FCC, then it coordinates with Intelsat and fi-
nally it receives clearance with the receiving country through the State Department
which acts as a conduit. Id.
204. Report on ISDCA Bill, supra note 196, at 82. Meanwhile, the Department of
State and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the
Department of Commerce have requested that the FCC delay final implementation of
the extension of services to a Bermudan cable company until the copyright question
is resolved. The MPAA contends that authorization by the FCC of transborder deliv-
ery does not adequately address the international copyright implications of the deci-
sion. The FCC focuses more on telecommunications and regional communications
networks than on intellectual property issues. CBI-1983 Hearing, supra note 41, at
397-98.
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any remuneration for the retransmission of their works
abroad.20 5
III. OPTIONS AND PROPOSALS
The complementary proposals that follow represent a
combination of efforts to 1) adopt workable international laws
specifically dealing with copyright and communications satel-
lites;20 6 2) enforce and implement the provisions of inter-
national copyright treaties on a national scale; 20 7 and 3) en-
courage incentives for foreign countries to increase the copy-
right protections afforded by their domestic laws and to ratify
international copyright treaties.20 8
The previous discussion of the signal theft in Canada and
the Caribbean Basin, focused on short-term preventive meas-
ures tailored to meet the particular relationships existing be-
tween the United States and these states.20 9 The United States
should further develop bilateral arrangements similar to the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which tie copyright protection to
trade sanctions and foreign aid.210
The United States should also enter into agreements or
undertakings with neighboring states which plan to receive
transborder signals originating in the United States. 21 ' For-
eign distributors of United States satellite signals should agree
to obtain permission from the program originators and/or
owners before distributing copyrighted programs.21 2
205. Under United States copyright law these retransmissions are public per-
formances put within the exclusive control of owners of copyrights in the program-
ming. Copyright Act, supra note 8, § 106(4). Section 111 of the Copyright Act ex-
empts and limits the owner's public performance rights to secondary transmissions
by cable television systems and resale carriers who serve them. Therefore, resale
carriers are exempt from copyright liability under the compulsory licensing system.
The foreign distributors planning to receive signals originating from the United
States via resale carriers should be required to obtain permission from program orig-
inators/owners prior to distribution. Otherwise, the foreign distributors have an un-
fair advantage. Under the compulsory licensing system, only the resale carriers
would pay authorization fees. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 25.
206. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 112-205 and accompanying text.
210. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 48.
211. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 64.
212. Id.
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The United States should consider a number of long-
range options and proposals in addition to the short-term
measures mentioned previously. Therefore, the United States
should ratify the Berne Convention, while also providing the
requisite national implementing legislation.21 3 If the United
States indicates a willingness to conform its domestic law to
the standards set forth in the international copyright conven-
tions, other nations may be encouraged to fashion their na-
tional laws accordingly. The United States should ratify the
Brussels Satellite Convention. 2 4 The Convention merely re-
quires contracting states to take "adequate measures" to pro-
vide copyright protection to foreign nationals and does not
necessarily require new implementing legislation.21 5 United
States law already provides implementing legislation in the
form of the Copyright Act of 1976216 and the Communications
Act of 1934.2 7 However, revision of both of these statutes is
advised.21 8 In this way, the enforceability of the Berne and
213. Id. at 64; see supra note 13 (discussing Berne Convention provisions which
member countries must include in their domestic copyright law).
214. The Department of State, the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration (NTIA) and the Copyright Office all support United States ratifi-
cation of the Brussels Satellite Convention. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 7, at 32-
33. Both the NTIA and the Copyright Office view § 605 of the Communications Act
of 1934, taken together with the relevant provisions of United States copyright law,
as adequate implementing legislation. Id. In the last two years, representatives of
the broadcast and program supply industries have been expressing almost unani-
mous support for ratification of the Convention by the United States. Id. This is due
to: "1. Increased use of satellites for the delivery of programming; 2. Low cost of
satellite reception earth stations; 3. Widespread unauthorized international intercep-
tion of U.S. program-carrying satellite signals; and 4. Realization that a new, stronger
Convention would not be created." Id.
215. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
216. Copyright Act, supra note 8.
217. Communications Act of 1934, supra note 99.
218. Section 11 (c) of the Copyright Act should be amended "to confer upon
broadcast stations exclusive rights to syndicated programming and motion pictures
within their respective market areas." Report on Proposed Copyright Amendments Bill,
supra note 105, at 5. The Communications Act of 1934 should do away with FCC
restrictions on broadcast stations or other video services whose signals may be car-
ried by a cable television system. Id. at 8, 34. Finally, definitional amendments, up-
dating the anachronistic language of the stations, should be applied to both Acts. Id.
at 6; Communications Act Bill, supra note 105, at 96-105.
The effect of these amendments is twofold: First, the definitional revisions make
it possible to include satellite transmissions as applicable under the statutes. Compul-
sory Licensing Hearing, supra note 105, at 58-64. Second, increased flexibility in the
compulsory licensing system enables copyright owners to receive just compensation
for each exploitation of their works. Id. Foreign nations presently receiving royalties
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Brussels Conventions would be assured. The I.T.C. should be
enforced through the institution of mandatory arbitration pro-
ceedings.2 t9 Many of the disputing countries which adhere to
the I.T.C. would then be under pressure to negotiate and to
arrive at workable terms. Finally, the United States should
provide specific domestic remedies for its copyright owners in
the form of penal sanctions against theft of satellite services.220
CONCLUSION
The unauthorized interception and transmission of United
States satellite signals by foreign countries is one of the more
troublesome results of recent advances in satellite communica-
tions technology. International copyright treaties, drafted
prior to these new technological developments, present insuffi-
cient protection to United States owners of copyrighted pro-
grams.2 2' International copyright law, even in its updated
form, is characterized by interpretation, application and en-
forcement problems. Additionally, incentives on the part of
foreign nations to increase the copyright protection afforded
the United States under the treaty principle of national treat-
ment are weak at best. 2 2 2
Solutions to the problem of signal theft in Canada and the
Caribbean Basin have been proposed. The International
Copyright Fairness Bill, a proposal to amend the Copyright
Act, primarily addresses the situation in Canada.22 3 The Bill
has not been met with support because it is more of a sanction
than a solution. In contrast, the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
provides a workable solution. It creates incentive on the part
of the Caribbean Basin countries to improve the copyright pro-
tection afforded United States copyrighted exports.224
United States programs such as the Caribbean Basin Initi-
under the compulsory licensing system for the use of their works in the United States
would no longer receive statutory compensation. They would have to rely on negoti-
ating licensing arrangements, as do United States copyright owners whose works are
received in foreign countries. See generally id. (for discussion of amendments to the
compulsory licensing system).
219. MPEAA Memo, supra note 1, at 63.
220. Id. at 64.
221. See supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 60-191 and accompanying text.
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ative, provide pragmatic stop-gap measures to deal with the
problem of signal theft. However, additional steps must be
taken in order to fill the gaps inherent in current international
copyright law. The United States must adopt a combination of
complementary, long-term measures to remedy signal theft.
These include: 1) the ratification and implementation of
conventional international treaties, specifically addressing
copyright and signal theft;225 and 2) the adoption of new, inno-
vative United States programs, derived from legislation and
enforced by vigorous executive and administrative agency ac-
tion.2 2 6 Finally and ideally, ratification of the Brussels Conven-
tion would provide a long range solution to the problem of
signal theft.2 27 Approaching the issue through the direct de-
velopment of international copyright law would reduce the
need for programs like the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Lori A. Yarvis
225. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
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